Abstract

What makes the politics of resentment flourish in sub-Sahara Africa? The politics of resentment in sub-Sahara Africa can be defined as resentment and anger towards a system of governance widely viewed as bias, exploitative and repressive.[1] In a politics of resentment, anger manifests as a result of perceived state oppression and injustice. Instead of blaming corrupt elites and colonial powers, sub-Sahara Africans misplace blame on each other for the misery they experience. A politics of resentment is located between different communities of people. These communities of difference come about due to state oppression that is part and parcel of postcolonial experiences. There is a "re-channeling of resentment." Africans, instead of directing their dissatisfaction with their oppressive regimes and morally depraved rulers as well as against residues of colonialism that prevent the flourishing of life, turn their anger at each other. [2]

This paper explores the sources of resentment that sub-Sahara African citizens have towards each other in historical and contemporary contexts. I argue that resentments in sub-Sahara Africa are layered, entangled, and nourish one another. The politics of resentment in sub-Sahara Africa is animated by three resentments between groups based on geographic, economic, and ethnic considerations. These resentments intertwine with one another and shape how sub-Sahara Africans make sense of the world around them. I will explore the multiple ways in which resentment is actively produced to wield state power during the colonial and postcolonial period. The ways that resentment has wielded state power is much more transparent in the colonial period – while in the postcolonial period, the methods are a lot more discreet.

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[1] Quaker-Dokubo, Charles. "A Nigerian case studies." Politics of identity and exclusion in Africa: From violent confrontation to peaceful cooperation (2001): 43-56.

[2] Eze, Chielozona. "Hate Your Enemy: The Anatomy of Resentment in Africa's Cultural Resistance to the West." (2005).

The three resentments assume form because of European conquest and domination. These resentments are not a resistance of hegemonic colonialism and modern development practices but are instead instances of misplaced resentment. Conflicts of ideology, and especially the balance of power between different interest groups, manifest in these three categories of resentment. These conflicts are amplified by colonial histories and logics. Feelings of resentment are not aimed at building viable societies. They justify one's social and cultural system by negating the world of the other.[3] These feelings are shaped by colonial domination and continuing colonial logics and structures. Africans have been trapped in resentment.[4] Resentment at the fact they have been oppressed, abused, belittled, cheated, turned against each other and then blamed for their "savagery" against each other. This resentment has not allowed Africans to reflect on what these realities have meant for their psyches, both historical and current.

Resentment is a powerful human emotion that has both private and social dimensions where it manifests in a variety of ways.[5] Remnants of colonialism and African elites often exacerbate tensions between citizens and create new power asymmetries that yield anger and discontent. Fellow sub-Sahara Africans direct this discontent at each other. Resentment refers to a feeling of displeasure induced by being insulted, offended or deprived.[6] It is typically a reaction to slights or affronts, to assaults, wither mild or severe, upon ones self. The reactive

[3] Eze, Chielozana. "Resentment and the African Condition: An Inquiry." GEFAME Journal of African Studies 2, no. 1 (2005).

[4] Adams, Rachel Nyaradzo. "Of Anger and Shame in Africa." This is africa, November 13, 2014. https://thisisafrica.me/african-identities/anger-shame-africa/.

[5] Balcomb, Anthony. "Resentment–excavating a resurgent phenomenon in contemporary society." Scriptura: Journal for Contextual Hermeneutics in Southern Africa 120, no. 1 (2021): 1-15.

[6] Meltzer, Bernard N., and Gil Richard Musolf. "Resentment and ressentiment." Sociological Inquiry 72, no. 2 (2002): 240-255.

feeling of resentment is based on the actor's definition of the insult, slight, sense of deprivation, or other felt injury as unwarranted or unjust – the result of wrongful conduct or unfair insitutions. Colonial violence and modern neoliberal development practice reproduce violence and resentment between fellow citizens. These nauseating phenomena erode common humanity and pan-African solidarity.

I propose replacing the politics of resentment with a politics of consensus. A politics of consenus was often the order of the day in African deliberations, and on principle.[7] African culture encourages a politics of consensus.[8] The African belief that persons are related to other persons and non-persons such as the divine, animals and plants and to the physical and social universe is rooted in consensus. A politics of consensus in a modern context would involve celebrating multiple modalities of development and ways of knowing. A healthy pan African coexistence should exist between the farmer and the entrepreneur, the indigenous and the urban and the artist and the doctor. In a Pan-African coexistence and consensus, each person should be able to celebrate their own modality – without colonial logics and modern austerity measures corrupting unity. Technology, science and innovation should be celebrated alongside tradition and indigenous ways of knowing. Strong and just states should take care of African citizens, and tribal and ethnic divisions of the colonial past should be abandoned. Africans should determine their own fate without interference. A politics of consenus will restore the hope and optimism that Africans had at the beginning of the post colonial period. It will free Africa from neocolonial shackles that have prevented the continent from maximizing its full potential.

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[7] Wiredu, Kwasi. "Democracy and consensus in African traditional politics: A plea for a non-party polity." The Centennial Review 39, no. 1 (1995): 53-64.

[8] Bamikole, Lawrence O. "Livity as a Dimension of Identity in Rastafari Thought: Implications for Development in Africana Societies." Caribbean Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2017): 451-466.

The politics of resentment in Sub-Sahara Africa

The politics of resentment in Sub-Sahara Africa involves political leaders who mobilize followers around the perception that the groups dignity had been affronted, disparaged, or otherwise disregarded.[9] This resentment engenders demands for public recognition of the dignity of the group in question. A humiliated group seeking restitution of its dignity carries far more emotional weight than people simply pursing their economic advantage. Sub-Sahara Africa is known for its enourmous capacity to evolve and brutally deploy political, social, cultural, and economic systems and traditions tailor-made for colonialism, oppression, exploitation and domination – and deeply embedded in these systems has been a culture of humiliation used mostly by the privileged and powerful to publicly and brutally humiliate individuals, families, communities, nations or countries perceived or conveniently branded as enemies. This creates resentment between people.[10]

The politics of resentment goes beyond just generational tensions. While generational tensions involve various actors simply using the notions of African, Western, modern, and traditional as markers of difference and tension, resentment is angrier, more intense and see's the other as unhuman.[11] While matters of cultural heritage and shifts in gender and sexuality reflect a field of generational tension and ambivalence in post-colonial Africa – resentment is much more intense – it is a passionate resistance of the other in an oppressive state.[12] Resentment is an

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[9] Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: The demand for dignity and the politics of resentment. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2018.

[10] Keyman, Hassan. Humiliation in the context of recent events in the Horn of Africa

[11] Spronk, Rachel. ""I am African, iko nini": Generational Conflict and the Politics of Being in Nairobi." African Diaspora 7, no. 2 (2014): 205-233.

[12] Eze, Chielozona. "The pitfalls of cultural consciousness." Philosophia Africana: Analysis of Philosophy and Issues in Africa and the Black Diaspora 10, no. 1 (2007): 37-48.

intense and passionate response to colonial exploiation and consequent underdevelopment of the colonies.[13] It was the common theme around which Africa's nationalists rallied to confront the colonial governments – and push for political independence. African nationalists vehmetly opposed colonial rule and advocated for self-government – ostensibly to curb the exploitation that colonialism represented and to work for the economic development of the contienent. Colonialism was seen as a evil that must be eliminated in order to give Africa its rightful place in the global political economy. In the post colonial period, Africans wanted to come together irrespective of ethnicity or religious beliefs to fight against the perceived common enemy of that era – European colonial masters.

The politics of resentment disrupted the Pan-African optimism of the postcolonial period. The politics of resentment is animated by conflicts in colonial and post-colonial sub-Sahara Africa that can be traced back to the inability of the postcolonial subject to transcend the violence and displacement of colonialism. Resentment is animated by historical and ideological alienation.[14] It is intensified by inequality and animated by a feeling of injustice. Resentment is the feeling of the weak who show disappointment and humiliation towards injustice.[15] In postcolonial Angola and Mozambique, ethnic resentment is vibrant. Resentment in Sierra Leone and Rwanda yielded civil war.

The politics of resentment arises when emotions are particularly powerful and yet must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling that one is unable to act them out –

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[13] Kalu, Kenneth, and Toyin Falola, eds. Exploitation and misrule in colonial and Postcolonial Africa. Springer, 2018.

[14] Fassin, Didier. "On resentment and ressentiment: the politics and ethics of moral emotions." Current Anthropology 54, no. 3 (2013): 249-267.

[15] Insuwan, Chatuporn. "Cultural identity loss of the main characters in Chinua Achebe's things fall apart and VS Naipaul's Half a Life: A Post-Colonial analysis." PhD diss., 2014.

perhaps because of physical or mental weakness or fear.[16] Resentment is chiefly confined to those who serve and are dominated – and this yields a vehement resentment against the other, which include those residing in the city, political and economic elites, or a different ethnic group all together. Colonialism in Rwanda had a detrimental impact on the social, political, and economic composition of the country.[17] It consolidated a superior position for Tutsi – and it also increasingly portrayed them as foreign migrants who occupy the country and oppress its orginal inhabitants. There was a growing feeling of inferiority and resentment among Hutu against both colonial and Tutsi supremacy. Some Batutsi considered themselves as superior when it comes to knowledge, administration and warfare strategies, while some ethnic Hutu saw themselves as inferior. Towards the end of the colonial area (1950s) this resentment was aggravated by the colonial administration and Belgian missionaries, called the White Fathers. When the colonial powers saw that African elites were demanding independence, they changed their policies in the colonies. The Belgians dropped their old allies, the Tutsis, in Rwanda and turned towards the Hutus. They made the Hutus understand that the time had come for them to take the upper hand and take revenge against the Tutsi oppressors. These shifts in alliances nourished the politics of resentment in the country. The notion of resentment in sub-Saharan Africa can be used to indicate a past of oppression, domination, and a historic grief of loss.[18] The sub-Saharan African subject has always been a victim of an intense oppression that has yielded resentment.

Simmering resentments and anger against colonial administrative intrusions assumes form in the colonial period – and violence against colonial authorities occurred in 1914 and

[16] Scheler, Max. "Ressentiment." (1961).

[17] Buckley-Zistel, Susanne. "Nation, narration, unification? The politics of history teaching after the Rwandan genocide." Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 1 (2009): 31-53.

[18] Dibaba, Assefa Tefera. "Oromo Social Resentment: Re-envisioning Resentment Theory, an African Perspective." Journal of Pan African Studies 11, no. 7 (2018).

1918.[19] When the colonial authorities leave, Sub-Sahara Africans channel anger, frustration, and resentment on to each other instead of their oppressors. A politics of consensus, not resentment existed in the precolonial period in Sub-Sahara Africa. There is considerable evidence that decision by consensus was often the order of the day in African deliberations and on principle.[20] In precolonial Sub-Sahara Africa, consensus characterized political decision-making. Consensus was a manifestation of an immanent approach to social interaction. In interpersonal relations among adults in precolonial Sub-Sahara Africa – consensus was a basis of joint action. This is not to say that it was always achieved. Nowhere was African society a realm of unbroken harmony. Conflicts between and within lineages and ethnic groups were not infrequent in the precolonial period. The achievement is that if and when a resolution of the issues was negotiated – the point of it was the attainment of reconciliation rather than the mere abstention from further recriminations or collisions.

African protest in the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta during colonial rule were a result of resentments which provoked revolt in localities where armed confrontation was the only option.[21] These compelling factors included forced labor, burdensome taxation, conscription, requisitions, and an attack on indigenous political institutions, notably chieftaincy. The use of repressive police measures – as manifested in the Native Penal and *Indigénat* Codes – exacerbated African resentment. In Southern Nigeria in 1916 and 1927, colonial efforts to introduce direct taxation were highly contested, triggering a series of major tax revolts,

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[19] Moyd, Michelle. "Resistance and Rebellions (Africa)." 1914–1918 online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War (2017).

[20] Ibid.

[21] Asiwaju, Anthony I. "Migrations as revolt: the example of the Ivory Coast and the Upper Volta before 1945." the Journal of African history 17, no. 4 (1976): 577-594.

culminating in the Aba Women's War of 1929.[22] While southern Nigerian societies also had pre-existing traditions of taxation through a range of tolls, trade taxes and tributes – colonial direct taxation was met with deep-seated popular resistance and resentment. The form and collection system deviated from local practice, and had a cultural association with the redemption of slaves. Yet another payement to the colonial government on top of existing forms of extraction – combined with the unfamiliar and often brutal modes of collection – and the depressed economic conditions of the inter-war period made direct taxation even more unbearable. Far from engaging in tax bargaining, anti-tax riots were brutally suppressed by military and police action in which hundreds were killed, property burnt and tax offenders imprisoned, entrenching resentment against the colonial state.

Colonization and decolonization have always been violent phenomenon that yield resentment between citizens.[23] From relationships between individuals to those on directing boards of national or private banks, decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain "species" of men by another "species" of men. This bequeaths violence and frustration that post-colonial subjects' channel on to each other. Many historians of decolonization in Africa would disagree with Fanon. They argue that the postcolonial period was not simply a continuation of colonialism with different actors. Either way, colonialism is such a strong force that it yields the same outcome in both scenarios – a weak and resentful Africa unable to reach its full potential.

As Franz Fanon postulates, in its narcissistic monologue, the colonialist bourgeoisie, by way of its academics, implanted in the minds of the colonized, that essential values – meaning Western values – remain eternal despite all errors attributable to man. These colonial

[22] Meagher, Kate. "Taxing times: Taxation, divided societies and the informal economy in Northern Nigeria." The Journal of development studies 54, no. 1 (2018): 1-17.

[23] Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth: Tr. From the French by Constance Farrington. Grove Press, 1963.

logics bequeath and reproduce geographic, economic, and ethnic resentments between sub-Saharan Africans across space and time. South Africa's relation to its violent history is colonial and postcolonial – and postapartheid contrasts a desire for reconciliation and a reality of resentment.[24] In South Africa, the politics of resentment expresses a more ambivalent and painful acknowledgement that the past is still deeply present through racism, inequalities and prejudices. Resentment is an existential and dominant feature. It is a result of a long and personal and historical evolution.

The feeling of resentment that sub-Sahara Africans have towards one another is transmitted from the colonial period to the post-colonial period – and this transmission disrupts the politics of consensus that sub-Sahara Africans once enjoyed. Indeed, Africa's democratic heritage and values are rooted in her traditional past.[25] Kwame Nkrumah, the revolutionary former President of Ghana, brilliantly postulates how imperialist forces transmitted resentments across place and time in Africa. As he notes, western imperialists, without exception, constantly evolved the means and tailored colonial policies to satisfy their barbaric ends – namely the exploitation of the subject territories, for the aggrandizement of the metropolitan countries.[26] The colonial authorities always subserved the needs of the subject lands to their own demands – they circumcised human rights and liberties, they repressed, despoiled, degraded, and oppressed. Colonial powers took the lands, lives, recourses, and dignity of Africans. This leaves sub-Sahara Africans with nothing but resentment towards themselves and each other.

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[24] Fassin, Didier. "The embodied past. From paranoid style to politics of memory in South Africa." Social Anthropology 16, no. 3 (2008): 312-328.

[25] Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem. "Towards an African theory of democracy." Institute of African Studies Research Review 25, no. 1 (2009): 1-21.

[26] Nkrumah, Kwame, Roberta Arrigoni, and Giorgio Napolitano. Africa must unite. London: Heinemann, 1963.

Geographic resentments

I will define geographic resentments in sub-Sahara Africa as a placed based resentment that is a basis of group delineation – distinguishing "us over here" from "them over there".[27] Colonialism in sub-Sahara Africa can be defined as a direct and overall domination of the continent by western powers from 1800 – 1960s and much later for southern Africa.[28] Colonialism directly nourishes divides and inequalities between rural and urban sub-Saharan Africans that are omnipresent until this day. This yields historical and contemporary resentments that are divided on geographic lines.

Western colonialism in sub-Sahara Africa produced disarticulation in the provision of social amenities and urbanization patterns. Most of the little social amenities provided during the colonial period were concentrated in vibrant city centers – and this yields power hierarchies between urban and rural. Colonial authorties wanted to create divisions that fulfilled the extractive aims of the colonial state. During the colonial period, there was a power struggle over the use of these amenities. Cities became overcrowded and new urbanization problems assumed form. Colonial mismanagement yielded excess migration, overcrowding and poor hygiene. Tribal and ethnic resentments arose as a result. These are ideal conditions for a politics of resentment to flourish – and these dynamics yield geographic tensions across sub-Saharan Africa across space and time. This illustrates to us that resentments are layered and intertwined, as overcrowding and new urbanization problems are directly linked to tribal and ethnic resentments. These resentments are a direct result of colonial rule. Thid is not to say sub-Sahara Africans do

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[27] Munis, B. K. "Divided by place: The enduring geographical fault lines of American politics." PhD diss., Doctoral Dissertation, University of Virginia.

[28] Ocheni, Stephen, and Basil C. Nwankwo. "Analysis of colonialism and its impact in Africa." Cross-Cultural Communication 8, no. 3 (2012): 46-54.

not have agency. Many aspired to live an urban life. Some wanted to escape the drudgery of rural life, particularly due to the conditions that came with farming. Colonial policies didn't help.

The sub-Saharan African colonies were oppressed, exploited, and disregarded – and this is best illustrated by the pattern of the economic infrastructure of sub-Saharan African colonies, notably, their roads and railways – which had a clear geographical distribution according to the extent to which regions needed to be opened to import/export activities.[29] Where exports were not available, roads and railways had no place – illustrating to us that colonial practices bequeath inequity and underdevelopment. These uneven distribution of infrastructure created divisions and produced resentment in the form of people perceiving others as being wealthy and privileged.

Rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa exist in places like the southern side of Mount Kilimanjaro in Northern Tanzania – and these linkages are entangled with inequalities that bequeath resentment.[30] One of the main features of the historical background is the differentiation of mountain farmers (mainly Chagga in Mt Kilimanjaro) and lowlands pastoralists (mainly Maasi). More and more competition and resentment (especially for land) exists between those two groups of population. Strong population growth yields strong resentment between citizens. In the colonial period, the first step of urban development in rural areas near Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania was animated by core-periphery relationships in which the core is urban, and the periphery is rural. This power asymmetry was rooted in colonial logics and development discourse – as imported urbanization resulted in moving the core downward from highlands to lowlands, attracting some population flows downward. Most of the rural population

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[29] Rodney, Walter. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Verso Books, 2018.

[30] Charlery de la Masselière, Bernard, François Bart, Bénédicte Thibaud, and Rémi Benos. "Revisiting the rural-urban linkages in East Africa: Continuity or breakdown in the spatial model of rural development? The case of the Kilimanjaro region in Tanzania." Belgeo. Revue belge de géographie 1 (2020).

was living on highlands, in scattered settlements. When urban development started in lowlands, many citizens moved down.

The core (highest population densities, agricultural production) was on the top mountain slopes while the periphery was situated in dry and quite empty lowlands. As a result, the core started to slide down the slopes. This illustrates to use that the evolution of the urban-rural divide in colonial Tanzania is due to the destructive nature of colonial urban development practices that produced resentment. Colonial urbanization and development practice is animated by an unstable dichotomy between markets and the workforce. Markets signify external and urban modalities while the workforce depends on the field of action of customs.

Colonial development policies attempt to create a way of linking the rural to the urban. Colonial development and urbanization policies bequeath intense resentments that result in rural areas breaking into territories. Colonial development and urbanization policies displace peoples and create new inequalities. They fail to consider the heterogeneity of rural areas. In the Kilimanjaro region, strong ethnic resentments become institutionalized as a result. The emergence of Chagga political identity on Mount Kilimanjaro in the 1940s and 1950s can be best understood as a product of intensive debates over the control of natural recourses and the nature of chiefly authority.[31] Threats to the land and water recourses of the mountain yielded resentment of the role of the chiefs. In the 1940s, increasing land and water scarcity fueled popular resentment against the mangis (chiefs) for working with colonial authorities to disrupt life.

Colonialism bequeaths geographic resentments that are directly linked with ethnic resentments. Colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa produces an immense range of social

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[31] Bender, Matthew V. "Being 'Chagga': natural resources, political activism, and identity on Kilimanjaro." The Journal of African History 54, no. 2 (2013): 199-220.

formations, habitats and modes of livelihood that attempted to impose its own structures, and notions of order and progress, through 'pacification' and then through its various and contradictory forms of social engineering.[32] Along this line, the development of the productive forces comes into conflict with social relations, and the formation and logics of capitalism are the result.[33] These logics positions sub-Saharan Africans against each other and erode communal traditions.

Modern sub-Saharan African cities appear to be the locus of power and are postcolonial tools of dominance.[34] In the postcolonial period, Sub-Saharan Africa cities rapidly expand.[35] In the mid 20th century, cities like Luanda in Angola become transformed by actions undertaken by the state and/or private sector with government incentives. The forging of Luanda is animated by significant territorial fragmentation and an enormous level of social exclusion, affecting particularly the most deprived social groups. This geographic unevenness is a continuation of colonial patterns that create urban/rural tensions in the name of development.

During Portuguese colonization, the urban and housing policies drawn up in the metropolis, ignored the growing presence of local self-produced housing settlements. This phenomenon symbolizes to us that amid the implosion of the old morphologies of the urbanized city and the persistent islands of rurality lies a socio-spatial conflict, latent or overt. In Luanda, it expressed itself through increased spatial fragmentation, along with racial and social segregation.

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[32] Moyo, Sam, and Paris Yeros, eds. Reclaiming the land: The resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Zed Books, 2005.

[33] Samir Amin. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism.

[34] Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. "The process of urbanization in Africa (from the origins to the beginning of independence)." African Studies Review 34, no. 1 (1991): 1-98.

[35] Viegas, Sílvia Leiria. "Urbanisation and peri-urbanisation in Luanda: A geopolitical and socio-spatial perspective from the late colonial period to the present." Journal of Southern African Studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 595-618.

In Kinois (Kinshasa) – security, political and economic problems are dramatic, largely because the post-colonial state suddenly abdicated from its role as provider of social and administrative services.[36] The construction of Kinois identity is based on the cleavage between those who are Kinois and those who are not. Makokiers is a derogatory term used for people living in rural Congo – the country bumpkins who dare come to the clean city center.

Post-colonial metropolises in sub-Saharan Africa yield a new economy of knowledge-based activities and businesses driven by global capital. The conditions of post-coloniality, characterized by capital and its wasteland – bequeaths an excluded population.[37] In sub-Saharan African countries, the countryside began pouring into the cities soon after independence.[38] As a result, overurbanization and underdevelopment in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa become commonplace – and frustration and resentment flourishes across rural/urban lines.

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, urban growth rates from the 1960s were double the rate of natural population increase. Until the 1980s, city growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was subsidized by coercive policies that forced peasants to deliver farm products at below-market-value prices and taxed rural people at disproportionate rates. Urban bias in African development hardly worked to the advantage of the new urban masses. When postcolonial elites and armed forces took charge, public services in the cities rapidly deteriorated, and resentment flourished – although this was not the case in Tanzania – where the state actively concentrated resources in the rural areas but many Tanzanians did not want to stay there.

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[36] Trefon, Theodore. "The political economy of sacrifice: Kinois & the state." Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 93-94 (2002): 481-498.

[37] Bhattacharya, Rajesh, and Kalyan Sanyal. "Bypassing the Squalor: New Towns, Immaterial Labor and Exclusion in Post-Colonial Urbanization." Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 31 (2011): 41–48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23017875.

[38] Davis, Mike. "Planet of slums." New Perspectives Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2013): 11-12.

The rapid growth of Sub-Saharan African cities has meant that their economic development has frequently failed to keep pace with their demographic expansion, resulting in widespread unemployment and inadequate infrastructure and services.[39] These are ideal conditions for the politics of resentment to flourish between sub-Saharan Africans. Large populations of urban poor have emerged living and working on the margins of the modern city and the urban economy – and they feel stomped on like bugs by the elites.

In Dar es Salaam, the politics of resentment is in full swing – and this resentment is rooted in colonial logics. Post-independence politicians employed a wide range of Swahili terms in their fight against the "unproductive" urban poor. The principal source of colonial officials' anxieties could be reduced to just one category in Swahili: the *wahuni*. By the 1950s, the category of wahuni came to refer to all the un-, under-, and nefariously employed Africans who, from the colonial point of view, cluttered the streets of Dar es Salaam. The colonial state needed workers in the urban areas but never wanted them to stay there permanently – they did not want Africans to become detribalized. Many African men – especially those who wanted to separate form their elderly male kin's patronage, remained in the urban areas. This illustrates to us that colonialism was a disruptive yet incoherent practice that never took into account the needs of its subjects. Its ability to disrupt and destruct is what robs Sub-Sahara Africans of their nature and ability to communicate with one another. It is the inconsistencies of colonialism that prevents Sub-Sahara Africans from creating a coherent vision for themselves and their communities.

Colonial logics are often produced and reproduced in urban centers. The lesser, the dweller and the rural is a parasite that simultaneously takes space. They are nothing, according to

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[39] Burton, Andrew. Wahuni, the undesirables: African urbanization, crime, and colonial order in Dar es Salaam, 1919-1961. University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies (United Kingdom), 2000.

colonial logics. In this context, language is mobilized as a colonial tool that bequeaths resentments between citizens and produces it across place and time. *Wahuni* derives from the Swahili verb *huni,* which means to wander about for no reason, disobey or to be a vagabond.

Colonial logics have historically punished the marginalized, the unproductive and the free. These logics made the *wahuni* 'profligates', 'wastrels', 'gadabouts', 'lawless persons' or 'outcasts. By the 1930s 'wahuni' was passed into common usage as a pejorative term in Dar es Salaam. Colonial and post-colonial urbanization practices distinguish between the clean elite vs the dirty slum dweller. Colonial anxiety over the increasing numbers of Africans in Dar es Salaam, many of whom had no regular employment, was closely associated with the problem of urban lawlessness. This lawlessness was in part a product of strict colonial legislation which criminalized both customary and informal activates. The merging of colonial policy and logics creates spaces for resentment in sub-Saharan African across space and time.

There is a racial organization of space in colonial Tanganyika and official concern over the process of African urbanization.[40] For colonial officals, it was primarily African men who posed the threat of urban disorder. The anti-authoritarian behavior of African youth is evidence of the resentment felt towards colonial rule by the majority of the urban African population. Colonalism creates multiple resentments across populations. The colonizers are resented, as are the "unproductive" Wahuni. Resentment is reverberated across populations. Colonial policy that bequeaths urbanization, wither intentionally or not, precludes people from place and space, creating an "other". This yields resentment between people in cities. Colonial conditions in city centers is what creates resentments between the urban, the rural, the modern and the Wahuni.

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[40] Mbilinyi, Marjorie. "'City' and 'Countryside' in Colonial Tanganyika." Economic and Political Weekly 20, no. 43 (1985): WS88–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4374975.

Economic resentments

I will define economic resentments in sub-Saharan Africa as hostility driven by poverty, inequality and envy. This overlaps with geographic disparity. This hostility is often animated by anger and helplessness against sub-Saharan elites and politicians that put the citizenry in misery with their selfishness and callousness. Group resentments come from a sense of relative deprivation. They are targeted against other groups that are more closely associated with the regime in power or command greater economic resources.[41]

The cruelty of sub-Saharan African politicians is enforced by using hegemonic economic policies that were part and parcel of colonial rule. Postcolonial politicians in sub-Saharan Africa have a variety of tools and rhetoric to oppress the citizenry. For one, modern development discourse and practice, with its knack for displacement, austerity, and injustice – is the perfect ideology for politicians to exploit its citizenry and turn one sub-Saharan African against another.

Central to economic resentment in sub-Saharan Africa is a competition between citizens. Colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa brought about the emergence and institutionalization of class struggles in the socio-economic and political landscape of Africa.[42] Colonialism nourished a clear emergence and development of classes in Africa – and these classes included comprador bourgeois, petty bourgeois, proletariat, and the peasant. The African petty bourgeoise exploited the economy of African countries.

As colonialism collapsed, political elites in newly independent African states embraced development to pursue growth, revenue generation, and legitimacy.[43] Political elites in Africa

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[41] Fjelde, Hanne, and Gudrun Østby. "Socioeconomic inequality and communal conflict: A disaggregated analysis of sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008." International Interactions 40, no. 5 (2014): 737-762.

[42] Ibid.

[43] McMicheal, Philip. "Development and social change: A global perspective." (1996).

embraced the development project, mobilizing their national populations around the promise of rising living standards and economic growth to legitimize them in the eyes of the emerging citizenry.

Sub-Saharan African economies are animated by economic trends that degrade human dignity for most.[44] The peripheral capitalist systems introduced by colonial authorities and contemporary development practitioners yield rural people surviving in unbearable conditions amid disastrous land scarcity, urban shanty towns and congested roads. These hegemonic capitalist systems in sub-Saharan Africa yield unemployed, beggars, crime, misery, and resentment. This illustrates to us those geographic resentments and rural resentments are directly intertwined.

Economic resentment is often a result of crony sub-Saharan African capitalism that was enforced by colonial hegemony. In the social relations that crony capitalism bequeaths, misery is like air for most, but a very few elite sub-Saharan Africans unashamedly demonstrate conspicuous consumption, shopping at national department stores filled with luxury imports. This inequality illustrates to us that resentment is a feeling that is especially popular among the dominated, the ones who look at the very few sub-Saharan African elites with disdain and disgust. Sub-Saharan African elites also feel resentment for whom they see as uneducated country bumpkins. This resentment is misplaced and should instead be directed at the state and capitalist institutions and structures. Resentment that comes from envy makes its appearance when you desire something another person has, but you cannot have.[45] Wither it be an external

[44] Nafziger, E. Wayne. Review of African Capitalism, State Power, and Economic Development, by John Sender, Sheila Smith, Paul M. Lubeck, and Paul Kennedy. The Journal of Modern African Studies 28, no. 1 (1990): 141–50. http://www.jstor.org/stable/160905.

[45] Ibid.

object, or an ability or strength that the other has and you do not, envy can be an intense form of resentment. Envy is characterized by a sense of impotence because you do not have the power to obtain the object and shame, because this reflects on your own inability and weakness. The tension between desire and nonfulfillment leads to a resentment against the owner of the object who is then considered to be the cause of your privation. The more powerless you feel in obtaining the object, the more powerful the envy and resentment becomes.

Studies show the extent of class polarization and rural resentment at the local level in Southern Rwanda.[46] Grinding poverty and class divisions were an important factor in the conflicts. There was in Rwanda of the late 1980s and early 1990s growing regional polarization in political access, social polarization between rich and poor, and a strong awareness of increasing marginalization among urban poor and most rural dwellers. This shows us that geographic, economic and ethnic resentments are intertwined.

Income inequality produces resentment and frustration in Sub Saharan Africa – and it exacerbates the collective action problems of groups that hope to transcend their situation.[47] Western colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa nourished inequality in the colonial and postcolonial period. This is illustrated by the fact that rural Sierra Leone exhibited one of the most equal distributions of wealth estimated by any preindustrial rural society.[48] Later on, reduction in state services bequeaths economic resentments in Sierra Leone.[49] In the face of a major debt crisis and

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[46] Newbury, Catharine. "Background to genocide: Rwanda." African Issues 23, no. 2 (1995): 12-17.

[47] Nel, Philip. "Income inequality, economic growth, and political instability in sub-Saharan Africa." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 4 (2003): 611-639.

[48] Galli, Stefania, and Klas Rönnbäck. "Colonialism and rural inequality in Sierra Leone: an egalitarian experiment." European Review of Economic History 24, no. 3 (2020): 468-501.

[49] Keen, David. "Liberalization and conflict." International Political Science Review 26, no. 1 (2005): 73-89.

drastically falling export values in the 1980s, the state seemed to lack the will, the recourses, and the international encouragement to embark on a far-reaching program of public investment in transport, agriculture, education and health.In 1987, President Momoh approved harsh austerity measures to attract measures to attract further IMF support. Drastic reductions in food subsidies stoked a considerable fire of resentment.

The decline in educational services was important in generating resentment. In these circumstances, there was increasing resentment of those who did have access to a good education – normally in private schools or through private lessons or abroad. Some who lacked funds to pursue their education turned to the rebels. Student protests often grew into more general urban protests as students formed alliances with disenchanted youth beyond campus.

Rapid inflation and deep cuts in social services that austerity bequeathed lead to a drastic reduction in spending on state employees. Instead of creating an efficient free market, these austerity measures bequeathed increasing levels of violence and resentment. Many of those discarded by the state refused to go quietly. After a structural adjustment package had been agreed upon in 1991, drastic cuts ensued – and by 1994, in the midst of war, 40% of state employees has been dismissed. This creates anger and resentment – and some sources felt this had fed into covert support for the rebels.

The pattern of structural adjustements in Sierra Leone tended to reinforce the importance of clientelist networks in the single-party system dominated by the All People's Congress (APC). The vested interests which structural adjustements had in many ways reinforced and helped fuel resentment and insurgency. In the 1970s, under President Siaka Stevens, the exchange rate was artificially high, and state control over the economy favored elite accumulation at the expense of rural producers. A system bulit on rent seeking and urban bias will only create resentment.

Ethnic resentments

We will define ethnic resentments in the sub-Saharan African as the sense of ethnic identity felt by members of an ethnic community that creates resentments between the other.[50] Ethnicity is the combination of race, religion, culture, and land group identity. Leadership in many sub-Saharan African countries, with their ethnic diversities, are animated by ethnic bias and favoritism.[51] When ethnic differences become politized, they produce resentment.

Resourse competition in Africa nourishes ethnic conflict.[52] Ethno-territorial constituencies are the key prospective beneficiaries of state allocation decisions – as sectionally based local or regional administration constitutes an important mechanism for the distribution of economic benefits. Rival elites find it expedient to mobilize ethnic solidarities to gain power and privilege. This illustrates to us that economic and ethnic resentments are intertwined. In colonial and postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, tribal and ethnic networks were the safest bet for people's support. The fight to control the sub-Saharan states was organized around ethnic cleavages, reviving centuries-old resentment, and prejudice: genocidal tendencies and widespread banditry are rooted in the political economy of Africa's disconnection from the new global economy.[53] European colonialism has had profound and wideranging effects on the development of contemporary African states. The most profound legacy of colonialism is ethnic resentment.

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[50] Solomon, Hussein, and Sally Matthews. "Transforming ethnic conflicts." Politics of Identity and Exclusion in Africa: From Violent Confrontation to Peaceful Cooperation 11 (2001): 137.

[51] Ilorah, Richard. "Ethnic bias, favoritism and development in Africa." Development Southern Africa 26, no. 5 (2009): 695-707.

[52] Bates, Robert H. Ethnicity and Modernization in Contemporary Africa. No. 16. 1972.

[53] Duffield, Mark. "Introduction: The New Development—Security Terrain." Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security: 1-21.

When the European powers imposed formal territorial boundaries throughout the continent in 1885, the seeds for ethnic resentment in post-colonial Africa were perfectly sown.[54] Boundaries were drawn with little or no consideration to the actual distribution of indigenous ethno-cultural groups. With the demise of colonial rule, the former colonies, with their colonial borders essentially intact, were transformed into some of the most ethnically fragmented states in the world. The structural configuration of ethnic groups in a society is itself a part of the nation's colonial legacy.

Differences in the style of colonial administration practiced by Great Britain and France had profoundly different effects on the structure of inter-ethnic relations in a colony and, therefore, on the likelihood and form of postcolonial ethnic conflict and resentment. Ethnic conflict and resentment is more frequent and intense in former British colonies precisely because their indirect style of colonial rule left intact traditional patterns of social organization. At the end of colonial rule, these structures facilitated the mobalization of aggrieved minorities for collective action. The French strategy of administrative centralization amounted to an assault on traditional social insitutions. This leaves ethnic minorties devoid of the mobilizing structures necessary to mount an organized challenge to the post-colonial state, regardless of the extent of their resentment against the state. Both forms of colonialism leave the Sub-Sahara African with nothing but resentment and anger in the body – against the state and each other. Ethnic resentments in Sub-Sahara are nourished by colonialism. This disrupts the politics of consensus in pre colonial Sub-Sahara Africa. Colonalism has helped economic and ethnic resentment coincide. Social mobility for subordinate group members is restricted to ethnic markets.

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[54] Blanton, Robert, T. David Mason, and Brian Athow. "Colonial style and post-colonial ethnic conflict in Africa." Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 4 (2001): 473-491.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the sources of resentment that sub-Sahara African citizens have towards each other in historical and contemporary contexts. I have argued that the politics of resentment in sub-Saharan Africa can be based on geographic, economic, ethnic considerations or a combination of these.Inequity and underdevelopment assume form because of colonial practices. This bequeaths violence and resentment between sub-Saharan Africans. As Franz Fanon postulates, violence and repression are the natural state of colonial rule.[55] This violence gets reproduced in the postcolonial period, and it yields resentments between people across geographic, economic, and cultural lines.

Western colonial logics and postcolonial elites nourish geographic, economic, and ethnic resentments between Africans. In a politics of resentment, the powerless feel as if a boot is on their necks, and the elites look down on the powerless, stepping on them like bugs. The colonial powers watch with joy – as the IMF implements their vision that is incompatiable with African traditions. Colonialism has yielded urban biases, economic greivances and ethnic divisions. Modern day austerity measures have done the same. They have left the Sub-Sahara African with hunger in their belly and resentment in their body. To break from this cycle, I have proposed a politics of consenus that respects all forms of life and modalities of economic development. The hegemonic nature of development and austerity should be abandoned and consensus and unity should be celebrated. The state should be a democratic force that works to implement the hopes and aspirations of the people. It should be animated by justice and should work day and night to help Sub-Sahara Africans live the good life they have been deprived from for centuries.

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[55] Ibid.

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